b. The Second Proposition

102. The second initial proposition posited abovea [n.81] is shown in this way, because in Ord. I d.2 nn.101, 106, 126 it is proved as follows: it is not repugnant to the intellect of an angel to understand distinctly anything intelligible, even if there could be infinite intelligibles and of different idea and so disparate that none of them was the principle of knowing another. For, on the basis of these posits on the part of the intelligible object, there is not found on the part of the intellect any repugnance to prevent it perfectly and distinctly understanding all of them or any one of them. But the repugnance is that the intellect of an angel should distinctly understand them through a single act of understanding if they were infinite and disparate in the way stated [here n.102]. Therefore, it is not repugnant to an angel’s intellect to have different intellections really, though it is repugnant to an angel’s substance to be different substances really. Therefore not every understanding that is possible for an angel’s intellect can be the same as its substance; therefore it is an accident.

a.a [Interpolation] But some books have it differently: if the essence of a higher angel is the reason for knowing a lower one, then it contains it in its knowability and so in its entity; therefore it can produce the whole of it - just as, if the object were natural to it in two ways and artificial in the third way, the natural contains the artificial, because it contains what contains it, namely intellection productive of it [n.101].

103. These assumptions [sc. about what is repugnant, n.102] seem plain, besides this one, that ‘it is repugnant to a single finite intellect that it could be distinctly of infinite disparate objects’.

104. But this one I prove in three ways: first from the finitude of the intellection in itself, second from the finitude of the angelic intellect, third from the finitude of the angel’s essence.

105. [From the finitude of the intellection in itself] - From the first in two ways: First as follows: a single act of understanding, if it were of infinite disparate objects, would include eminently in itself the perfections of the infinite intellections that would naturally be had with respect to those objects. But it could not contain them eminently in itself unless it were intensively infinite (as is plain, because if the intellections were infinite in their proper ideas, there would be there an infinity of perfection of different ideas, because of the objects that are posited to be infinite and disparate). So, where they exist in a more eminent manner, there would have to be some infinity there - but not an extensive infinity, because the unity of what it is contained in would take such infinity away; therefore an intensive infinity.

106. Secondly as follows: every finite act of understanding is determined to a definite intelligible or to some definite intelligibles, such that it would be repugnant to it in itself that it be of things other than them or than it. But if the act of understanding in an angel is posited with respect to disparate intelligibles (were they to exist), it would not be thus determined; therefore it would not be finite.

107. [From the finitude of the angelic intellect] - I prove it, second, on the part of the angel’s intellect as follows: Things of which there is a single act of understanding can be understood together. But a finite intellect cannot at the same time distinctly understand infinite disparate objects, because it is a mark of greater power to understand distinctly many disparate objects at the same time than to understand few. Therefore to have distinct understanding of infinite disparate objects is a mark of a power intensively infinite.

108. To this proof [n.107] the response is made that intellection is not more perfect because it is of more objects, for the understanding that compares stone to wood is not more perfect than the pure understanding of stone, and yet the comparative intellection includes the intellection of more things, because it is of compared things.

109. This response supposes something false, and from the refutation of it the truth of our proposed position becomes clear. For the intellect cannot have an understanding comparing stone to wood unless it have the reasons for knowing each object. But the pure understanding of one of the objects can be had through the reason proper to only one object.     Therefore the comparative understanding necessarily requires a greater perfection in the formal principle of understanding than pure understanding does. But the effect does not necessarily require a greater perfection in the cause unless there is a greater perfection in the effect (at least in effects of the same idea); therefore etc     .

110. [From the finitude of the angel’s essence] - The third [n.103] is proved on the part of the object, or of the reason for understanding, in two ways:

The first as follows: one understanding requires one formal objective idea of understanding and one primary object, because if there are many primary objects the understandings will be numbered according to the number of their objects, just as things measured are numbered by their numbered measures, because of their actual dependence. Therefore, there must be one object of a single intellection and one formal idea of understanding. But it cannot be other than the essence of the angelic intellect, for, as is plain, this is the primary object in the angel’s intellection and the primary idea of understanding.

111. And if this is not similar in the intellection of anything else, you will be granting several primary objects. So there must be several intellections, or one must posit that the angel’s essence is the primary object and the formal idea of understanding whatever can be understood by it. But the consequent here is false for two reasons: first because some infinite being is intelligible to this intellect, but nothing finite can be the reason for understanding perfectly an infinite object; second because nothing can be the reason for knowing several things of different idea unless it contain eminently in itself all of them according to its knowability and so according to its entity. Therefore nothing can be the principle for knowing infinite disparate things, if they exist, unless it contain those infinite things eminently in itself. Therefore the essence of an angel, since it is finite, cannot be the reason for knowing such infinite objects.

112. Thus, therefore, on the supposition of the finitude of angelic intellection and of angelic intellect and essence (from Ord. I d.2, n.102), it follows that there can be in an angel different acts really of understanding and only one substance. Therefore an angel’s understanding is not the same as his substance; therefore it is an accident [n. 102].